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Societal Constitutionalism, Social
Movements, and Constitutionalism
from Below
GAVIN W. ANDERSON
ABSTRACT
Within constitutional theory, in comparison to other fields of
scholarship, the significance of transnational social movements has been
relatively unexamined in the literature. Societal constitutionalism,
grounded in the sociological method and open to reexamining received
understandings of constitutionalism, would appear conducive to
undertaking this enterprise. However, the general absence of social
movements from the societal constitutionalism literature is not
coincidental, and reflects a shared commitment with more conventional
approaches to an institutional conception of constitutionalism, and a
belief in the latter's necessary benevolence and Western origin. These
assumptions reflect the limited focus of contemporary analyses of
globalization and constitutionalism upon "globalization from above." As
key protagonists within "globalization from below," social movements
represent a form of "constitutionalism from below." Incorporating social
movements within constitutional discourse deepens the sociological turn
favored by societal constitutionalism by revealing the always-existing
noninstitutional dimension of constitutionalism. Moreover, doing so
locates in social movements the potential for a transformative
constitutional agency which has often proven elusive.
INTRODUCTION
In the evocative title of his 2012 book on "the new global
revolutions," BBC Newsnight economics editor Paul Mason asks "Why
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it's Kicking Off Everywhere." Focusing on recent high profile episodes of
social unrest, from the Arab Spring and mass demonstrations in Tehran
to the eponymous actions of the Occupy movement, Mason charts the
rise of a new form of political mobilization coordinated (if such be the
word) around social media and driven by technological innovation:
"spontaneous horizontal[ism]" 2 in place of the traditional forms of
top-down organized politics. Commenting on the meaning of this global
upsurge in rebellion and revolt, Mason argues that we are "in the
middle of a revolution"3 where even once unassailable features of
capitalism are being eroded. This revolution, he suggests, is reshaping
established hierarchies, and as a consequence is "changing the balance
of power between the leaders and the led."4 Perhaps the most striking
aspect of his analysis is that few in the citadels of power, whether Arab
dictatorships or corporate boardrooms, saw this coming.5 Accordingly,
he speculates that at the present juncture-and reversing historical
trends-those at the bottom, armed with their tweets and blogs, may
have the advantage of being more in tune with the times than those in
authority, whose monopoly of official force often proved futile in
maintaining their hold on power.6
From another perspective, these developments seem less surprising.
Rather than appearing out of the clear blue, they can be seen as the
latest manifestation of an emergent phenomenon described as
"globalization-from-below."7  The initial scholarly reaction to
globalization emphasized greater homogenization of national policies to
accord with the principles of liberalization and marketization of the
"Washington consensus." 8 More recently, the literature has focused
upon (generally Southern-based) resistance to these processes, calling
into doubt the hegemonic qualities formerly attributed to them.9 Much
of this latter scholarship has addressed the role played by social
movements in constructing an alternative vision of globalization to
neoliberalism and has generated extensive literature across a range of
1. PAUL MASON, WHY IT'S KICKING OFF EVERYWHERE: THE NEW GLOBAL
REVOLUTIONS (2012).
2. Id. at 44-46.
3. Id. at 3.
4. Id. at 83.
5. Id. at 25-39.
6. See id. at 65-66.
7. RICHARD FALK, PREDATORY GLOBALIZATION: A CRITIQUE 130 (1999).
8. For a collection of multiple articles exemplifying this reaction, see generally
GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL REFLECTIONS (James H. Mittelman ed., 1996).
9. See generally DONATELLA DELLA PORTA, MASSIMILIANO ANDREITA, LORENZO
MOSCA & HERBERT REITER, GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISTS AND
PROTEST NETWORKS (2006).
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disciplines, including ethics,10  human rights," anthropology,'12
international relations,13 political economy, 14 political history,15 and
legal sociology.' 6 The years 2009-2011 may in retrospect come to
represent the period when what had long been documented by scholars
of the global South became visible to Western eyes, not just because
parts of the South itself were changing in remarkable ways, but also
because "below" was no longer confined to the South and was all too
present on the streets of Western capitals.
For some, addressing the significance of transnational social
movements is one of the leading intellectual challenges of our time,
representing "the very beginning of a new field of study and of social
action."'7 Taking up this challenge, others have suggested that
adverting to social movements enables us to see the ostensibly ingrained
contours of established disciplines in a more fluid and potentially
transformative manner.'8 Underpinning these enterprises is the sense
that our perceived understandings of power, including its nature,
location, and how it can be challenged and remade, require reappraisal
once we bring social movements directly into the frame of analysis.
However, to adapt Mason's terminology, one discipline where this
process of rethinking is not "kicking off' is the field of constitutional
theory. While there is now an extensive literature on the constitutional
implications of "top-down" global regimes, such as the World Trade
Organization (WTO)19 or investment rules treaties, 20 there has been
very little analysis of the potential relevance of "bottom-up" phenomena
of social movements. This article addresses why this is the case and
what importance should be attached to this omission.
10. E.g., SIMON CRITCHLEY, INFINITELY DEMANDING: ETHICS OF COMMITMENT,
POLITICS OF RESISTANCE (2008).
11. E.g., NEIL STAMMERS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2009).
12. E.g., THE PRACTICE OF HUMAN RIGHTS: TRACKING LAW BETWEEN THE GLOBAL AND
THE LOCAL (Mark Goodale & Sally Engle Merry eds., 2007).
13. E.g., RONALDO MUNCK, GLOBALIZATION AND CONTESTATION: THE NEW GREAT
COUNTER-MOVEMENT (2007).
14. E.g., ROBERT O'BRIEN ET AL., CONTESTING GLOBAL GOVERNANCE: MULTILATERAL
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND GLOBAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2000).
15. E.g., CHARLES TILLY, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, 1768-2004 (2004).
16. E.g., LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY
(Boaventura de Sousa Santos & C6sar A. Rodriguez-Garavito eds., 2005).
17. MUNCK, supra note 13, at 24.
18. See, e.g., STAMMERS, supra note 11, at 11-14.
19. E.g., DEBORAH Z. CASS, THE CONSTITUTIONALIZATION OF THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION: LEGITIMACY, DEMOCRACY, AND COMMUNITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL
TRADING SYSTEM (2005).
20. E.g., David Schneiderman, Investment Rules and the New Constitutionalism, 25
LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 757 (2000).
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The principal argument advanced here is that the absence of social
movements from the constitutional literature is not coincidental, but
can be attributed to the potential difficulties they pose to some core
elements of constitutional thought. In particular, bringing social
movements into proximity with constitutional theory calls into question
assumptions that constitutionalism is inherently institutional, Western
in origin, and normatively positive. While such assumptions are
emblematic of liberal constitutional theory, the extent to which they
inform sociologically grounded accounts of the relation between
globalization and constitutionalism is indicated by the difficulties
encountered by the latter in accommodating a social movement
perspective.
This article further claims that the tension between adhering to
these assumptions and seeking to rework constitutional theory to
remain relevant in the global age means that the issue of social
movements can no longer be avoided. Moreover, doing so recovers the
crucial insight that as well as its more familiar "top-down" conception,
constitutionalism also has a "bottom-up" mode: constitutionalism from
above necessarily coexists with constitutionalism from below.
Accordingly, the assumptions detailed above sustain a partial account of
the nature of constitutionalism. The conclusion of this article is that
viewing constitutionalism from below as an integral part of
constitutional discourse in fact strengthens the constitutional
enterprise, enabling it to address two of its most trenchant
critiques-namely that it is "a lousy description of power"21 and that its
normative values are generally pressed into service of maintaining the
position of elites.22
I. SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS, AND THE
SOCIOLOGY OF ABSENCE
In one of the few attempts to consider the potential relevance of
social movements from a legal perspective, Balakrishnan Rajagopal
observes wryly that "[1]awyers generally do not concern themselves with
mass politics or popular resistance." 23 He attributes this to the inability
of mainstream legal discourse to accept or confront the epistemological
limitations of a "unitary conception of the political sphere," which sees
21. David Kennedy, The Mystery of Global Governance, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 827, 854
(2008).
22. RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOcRAcY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 50-99 (2004).
23. BALAKRISHNAN RAJAGOPAL, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPMENT,
SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 233 (2003).
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the state or the individual (and the relation between them) as the
principal focus for scholarship. 24 Rajagopal's analysis goes some way in
explaining the historical absence of social movements within
constitutional theory, especially its traditional, liberal conception where
the state-civil society divide has long been an organizing principle.
Much of the debate, though, over how constitutionalism should respond
to globalization focuses on the ways in which the advent of multilevel
governance undermines this "unitary conception" of politics, and seeks
to reconnect constitutional ideas to the new, often deeply pluralistic,
political relations of the global era. Might the time then be ripe to
extend constitutional analysis to the activities of social movements?
This question is particularly acute for theories of societal
constitutionalism, as the important innovations which this represents
within constitutional discourse in terms of the latter's response to
globalization might appear conducive to this enterprise. First, societal
constitutionalism's sociological outlook sees the starting place for
constitutional theory as the "is" of empirical observation rather than the
"ought" traditionally favored by abstract normative approaches-and
indeed can be read as warning against the dangers of conflating the two.
As such, societal constitutionalism may be open to engagement with the
constitutional implications of those analyses, which argue that if we are
seeking to address the question of who are currently the key actors
negotiating the nature and direction of global governance, social
movements are necessarily part of the answer. Secondly, and related,
societal constitutionalism is not hidebound by the statism implicit in a
"public institutional prejudice" 25 which can be discerned in other
accounts of "postnational constitutionalism." 26 Thus, in positing a
broader conception of constitutionalism, which specifically includes
economic sites such as corporations, societal constitutionalism would
seem to invite reflection on whether this conception can also include
other nonstate actors, such as social movements. Thirdly, rather than
adopting the counsel of despair characteristic of some progressive
scholars when conceptualizing globalization in constitutional terms,27
theorists of societal constitutionalism regard it as playing a role in
addressing problems such as environmental destruction and the global
24. Id. at 236.
25. Neil Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism, 65 MOD. L. REV. 317, 323
(2002).
26. Neil Walker, The EU and the WTO: Constitutionalism in a New Key, in THE EU
AND THE WTO: LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 31, 37 n.17 (Grdiinne de Bilrca &
Joanne Scott eds., 2001).
27. See James Tully, The Unfreedom of the Moderns in Comparison to Their Ideals of
Constitutional Democracy, 65 MOD. L. REV. 204, 215 (2002).
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financial crisis.28 There is an interesting parallel here with claims made
on behalf of social movements: they are engendering important changes
to global power relations, amounting to a rival paradigm of globalization
to neoliberalism in some versions. 29
Nonetheless, as with constitutional discourse in general, there is
little overt discussion of social movements in the societal
constitutionalism literature. Where there is reference to the struggles in
which they are engaged, there is the implication that "spontaneous
indignation, unrest, [and] protest" are in some sense "remot[e] from
philosophical, political, and legal discourses."s0 The argument presented
here is that this absence is not an oversight or casual omission, but
rather the absence highlights the embeddedness of certain patterns of
thinking in the constitutional consciousness. Thus, while societal
constitutionalism imagines a broader scope for constitutional discourse,
the manner in which constitutionalism is seen to operate in these new
settings reflects the continuing hold of key assumptions from the
nation-state era, assumptions about the necessary institutional,
benevolent, and Western nature of constitutionalism. However, a social
movement perspective highlights the work done by these assumptions
in narrowing the field of constitutional discourse and directs discussion
to what is at stake for societal constitutionalism in defending this line
against alternative constitutional readings that challenge these
assumptions.
In what follows, we deploy the concept of the "sociology of
absences" 31 to focus attention on societal constitutionalism's key method
of generalization and respecification for translating constitutionalism to
the transnational setting, and specifically to consider what the absence
of social movements from this process reveals about the potential
limitations of the former's understanding of constitutionalism. In doing
so, we take seriously the sociological method of societal
constitutionalism, and also the criticism that as it currently stands, the
28. See Gunther Teubner, Constitutionalizing Polycontexturality, in Gunther Teubner,
Hans Lindahl, Emilios Christodoulidis, & Chris Thornhill, Debate and Dialogue:
Constitutionalizing Polycontexturality, 20 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 210, 210 (2011).
29. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos, Beyond Neoliberal Governance: The World Social
Forum as Subaltern Cosmopolitan Politics and Legality, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM
BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY, supra note 16, at 29.
30. Gunther Teubner, Fragmented Foundations: Societal Constitutionalism Beyond the
Nation State, in THE TWILIGHT OF CONSTITUTIONALISM? 327, 341 (Petra Dobner & Martin
Loughlin eds., 2010).
31. Rosana de Lima Soares, Absences and Emergences: Production of Knowledge and
Social Transformation, 1 MATRIZES 231, 233 (2007) (Braz.).
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method is at times insufficiently sociological. 32  Thus, if
constitutionalism is broader than the traditional nation-state analysis,
adverting to social movements inquires into what distinguishes its
relocation to some nonstate sites, but not others. The question raised by
the foregoing is whether societal constitutionalism falls into the same
trap it warns against--of presenting the constitutional part for the
whole.
A. The Limits of Institutional Analysis
When undertaking the task of "generalising" and "re-specifying"
state-based approaches to constitutional theory in the context of
globalization, Gunther Teubner urges that it is important to avoid the
pitfall of "uncritically transferring nation-state circumstances to world
society," 33 and so not to underestimate the scale of conceptual
rethinking required. In this connection, one of the more specific dangers
that societal constitutionalism appears to identify, with a view to
avoiding, is to generalize constitutionalism while adhering to the "public
institutional bias" referred to above. Thus, in contrast with other
approaches to constitutionalism beyond the state, societal
constitutionalism regards theorizing the constitutional attributes of
supranational entities like the European Union (EU) or WTO as a
necessary, but insufficient, response to globalization. Such approaches
"confine the . . . relationship between juridification and
constitutionalisation to the political community,"34 and so omit
important phenomena from the scope of constitutional analysis, not only
corporations,3 5 but also other autonomous subsectors including health,
education, and the professions.3 6
However, while eschewing a public institutional bias, societal
constitutionalism can be regarded as generalizing a broadly
institutional conception of constitutionalism, and which, moreover,
provides an important continuity not just with the nation-state
tradition. This may, on its face, seem a counterintuitive claim: societal
constitutionalism speaks in terms of the "fragmented foundations" of
32. See CHRIS THORNHILL, A SOCIOLOGY OF CONSTITUTIONS: CONSTITUTIONS AND
STATE LEGITIMACY IN HISTORICAL-SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 5-6 (2011).
33. Gunther Teubner, Societal Constitutionalism: Alternatives to State-Centred
Constitutional Theory?, in TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM 3, 5
(Christian Joerges, et al. eds., 2004).
34. Id. at 16.
35. See DAVID SCIULLI, THEORY OF SOCIETAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: FOUNDATION OF A
NON-MARXIST CRITICAL THEORY 40-41 (Teresa Sullivan ed., 1992).
36. See Teubner, supra note 33, at 11.
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constitutionalism beyond the state, 37 and also warns against "[r]educing
transnational governance to institutionalised politics."38 The system's
theoretical underpinnings of societal constitutionalism are generally
seen as a challenge to statist thinking through its pluralistic conception
of law, grounded in the social ubiquity of the binary coding of
legal/nonlegal.39 However, while locating legal phenomena beyond the
state, the law that is thereby being pluralized can also be seen to
embody some of the key attributes of state law (which itself is theorized
in systematic terms). In this regard, it has been observed that theories
of reflexive law start "from a conception of the autonomy of law in the
liberal state,"40 which is then extended to whichever social subsystem
pluralist law is found. The argument outlined here is that in a similar
fashion, theories of societal constitutionalism share with state-based
accounts an institutionalized account of law and politics (and which, as
we will see, is integral to maintaining the autonomy of
constitutionalism in a nonstate context), and brings societal
constitutionalism closer to state constitutionalism in terms of its modus
operandi than is sometimes appreciated.
The language of institutionalization features heavily in the societal
constitutionalism literature. In David Sciulli's influential analysis, the
only effective counter to the 'massive evolutionary drift' of modern
society is to be found in "institutions of external procedural restraint."41
As developed by Gunther Teubner, the prerequisite to societal
constitutionalism is "social institutionalization."42 Tellingly, his
qualification of traditional understandings of the "polity" in
constitutional theory as "institutionalized politics" is to stress that the
former also includes "nonpolitical institutions of civil society."43 The
point being made here is not simply semantic: rather, it highlights the
similar ways that institutionalization is understood in both societal and
state-focused accounts of constitutionalism. First, as with traditional
accounts, for societal constitutionalism, institutional settings are
necessarily where processes of constitutionalization unfold. A core tenet
of societal constitutionalism is that juridification entails
constitutionalization, leading directly to its central thesis of a
37. Teubner, supra note 30, at 327.
38. Teubner, supra note 28, at 214.
39. See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHIA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 186
(2001).
40. BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: LAW,
GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 57 (2d ed. 2002).
41. SCIULLI, supra note 35, at 81.
42. Teubner, supra note 33, at 18.
43. Teubner, supra note 30, at 333 (emphasis added).
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multiplicity of civic constitutions.44 However, to complete the circle
suggested by Teubner's formulation above, it seems clear that for
societal constitutionalism, institutionalization is also the prerequisite
for juridification. Thus, societal constitutionalism can be regarded as
distancing itself from a particular sense of constitutionalism's
institutionalization in the nation-state, not its institutional character in
general. Moreover, the institutions of civil society which are discussed
bear a strong family resemblance to the state institutions of traditional
constitutional scholarship: Sciulli's "collegial formations" are typically
characterized by a significant degree of formal organization and
hierarchical structure, and include bodies such as professional
associations, corporations, universities, and hospitals.45 And while
Teubner speaks of the "dual constitution of organized and spontaneous
sectors," his describing the latter primarily in terms of a
"market-constituted spontaneous sector,"46 suggests that this does not
encompass the forms of popular resistance represented by social
movements.
The imperative behind this exclusion of the noninstitutional
becomes clearer when we consider why it is important for the societal
constitutionalism project to retain, in adapted form, the institutional
template of the nation-state era. We should recall that for Teubner, the
"historical role" of constitutions has been to secure social differentiation
in the face of the swamping tendencies inherent in modern society.
Crucially though, this function is discharged by both state and civil
constitutions. What is implicit is that both forms, but only those forms,
have the capability to bring about such outcomes, achieved in practice
by subsequent processes of juridification and constitutionalization:
forms which lack the sufficient institutional indicia are necessarily
incapable of performing this task. This leads him to conceptualize
constitutionalism primarily in terms of the "legally institutionalized
guarantees of a self-restraint of politics."47 Thus, what is being
generalized from the state setting are constitutionalism's mutually
reinforcing qualities of institutional capacity and legal autonomy, which
are now ascribed to the civic constitutions of civil society to ensure the
legal constraint of arbitrary power at the transnational level.
It is important to emphasize that what we are discussing here goes
beyond semantics. To reinforce this point, we consider how the
preceding discussion relates to differing theoretical orientations of
globalization. When theorists speak of globalization simpliciter, they
44. See Teubner, supra note 33, at 8.
45. See SCIULLI, supra note 35, at 80.
46. Teubner, supra note 33, at 27-28.
47. Id. at 12.
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often only have globalization from above in mind. Studies of this form of
globalization focus upon the "ideological and operational aspects of
globalization" whereby "transnational market forces dominate the policy
scene, including the significant co-optation of state power,"48 and
consequently emphasize the shift from regulation to governance. Taking
as their point of departure the divergence of scale between national law
and global economic activity, they seek to expand analyses of law and
globalization by theorizing nonstate regulatory forms. 49 However,
Santos argues that while this takes us beyond a narrow formal
conception of law, it is a highly partial account, which focuses almost
exclusively upon "the most visible, hegemonic actors," such as
multinational corporations.50 These actors are regarded as playing a
central role in overcoming regulatory issues which states and markets
alone cannot resolve through "collaborative networks involving firms
and secondary associations."5 This presents a somewhat technocratic
vision of "horizontal collaboration . . . by pragmatist governance"52
driven by elites, and which stresses the importance of "social
engineering -and institutional design."53 On this account, social
movements, and the constituencies represented by them, are irrelevant.
The social movements are only incorporated, if at all, once the
"institutional blueprint" has been fully established. 54
However, for Santos, the emergence of transnational networks of
social movements in resistance to neoliberalism as a distinctive form of
globalization from below underscores the partiality of regarding this
top-down account as exhausting our knowledge of globalization.55
Accordingly, if globalization is reconfiguring our understandings of
constitutionalism, this perspective asks why it should be presumed that
only the most hegemonic forms of globalization are pertinent to working
out that process. For analysts of global social movements, if we divert
our attention from social science's traditional preoccupation with the
top-down workings of institutions, we can recover some overlooked
insights into the nature of social interaction and transformation.
At the heart of the contemporary social movement literature is the
claim that institutional settings do not exhaust the options for political
48. FALK, supra note 7, at 130.
49. See Boaventura de Sousa Santos & C~sar A. Rodriguez-Garavito, Law, Politics,
and the Subaltern in Counter-Hegemonic Globalization, in LAW AND GLOBALIzATION FROM
BELOW, supra note 16, at 1, 5-6.
50. Id. at 2.
51. Id. at 7.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 5.
54. See id. at 9.
55. See Santos, supra note 29, at 43.
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engagement. Empirical analyses of social movements chart the
disillusionment with institutional politics as a means of promoting
emancipatory change, and the turn towards less formal mechanisms
such as mass protest and nonviolent civil disobedience.56 It should be
stressed, as will be discussed later, that the institutional dimension
does not disappear within this framework, as often the ultimate aim of
social movement mobilization is some transformation within
institutions themselves. Rather, the main thrust of social movement
analysis is that we need to reassess our understandings of institutions
in terms of their necessary-and always existing-relation with the
noninstitutional. Indeed, in the global context, this relation is seen as
embodying the dynamic for many pressing issues of the age, such as
environmental degradation5 7 or international labor standards.5 8 In the
present context, it is important to stress that the global context takes us
beyond the contrast social movements and state institutions, as the
former can also be differentiated from the institutional constituents of
societal constitutionalism.
For Robert O'Brien and his co-authors, one of the key political
developments of recent times has been the direct engagement between
social movements operating in transnational mode and the major
players in the global economy.59 This engagement forges a relation
between actors not traditionally encompassed within state
representative politics: powerful economic institutions, such as the
World Bank, the WTO, and transnational corporations on the one hand,
and on the other, social movements and the often disenfranchised
groups on whose behalf they act, such as indigenous peoples and the
poor.
If constitutionalism is concerned with the legal restraint of politics,
the omission of social movements from constitutional discourse would
appear to unduly narrow the scope of political action that the latter can
encompass. In contrast, as a consequence of the mobilization of social
movements on a transnational scale, what is counted as within the
sphere of the political is itself now open to question.60 There is a more
56. See generally GEOFFREY PLEYERS, ALTER-GLOBALIZATION: BECOMING ACTORS IN
THE GLOBAL AGE (2010) (undertaking empirical analyses of transnational social
movements to identify methods beyond formal institutions of affecting social and political
change).
57. See MUNCK, supra note 13, at 102-06.
58. See C~sar A. Rodriguez-Garavito, Nike's Law: The Anti-Sweatshop Movement,
Transnational Corporations, and the Struggle Over International Labor Rights in the
Americas, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN
LEGALITY, supra note 16, at 64, 64-66.
59. O'BRIEN ET AL., supra note 14, at 2.
60. MUNCK, supra note 13, at 28.
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fundamental point here. Namely, within this broader conception of
politics, assumptions about the institutional capacity of either state or
societal constitutionalism become more difficult to sustain. On the one
hand, social movements, by employing extra-institutional means, seem
to be able to frustrate the ability of institutional actors to exercise
constitutional constraint;61 on the other, social movements themselves
often emerge as more efficacious vehicles for constraining and reshaping
oppressive political relations.62 The social movement literature thus
posits an alternative understanding of social development and change,
where the institutional can only properly be understood through its
relation to the noninstitutional. As such, it raises the disturbing
prospect for societal constitutionalism that in discharging the task of
generalizing and respecifying, it seeks to reinscribe, at the level of
transnational constitutionalism, ideals of autonomy and capacity that
never pertained in the context of the nation-state. 63
B. Social Movements and Constitutional Asymmetries of Power
A social movement perspective also brings to light, and directs
critical attention to, assumptions underpinning why societal
constitutionalism believes it is important to fashion constitutional
solutions to problems of global governance. It is possible to read societal
constitutionalism solely at a sociological level, mapping out the
new-and fuller-terrain of global governance that is revealed once we
abandon the constraints of state-centered thinking. However, it also has
a deeply normative dimension. In essence, this rests on the view that
constitutionalism in the nation-state context should be seen in broadly
positive and benevolent terms, operating as a force for social good. It
should be recalled that, for Teubner, the central function of
constitutionalism is distilled to guaranteeing social differentiation
against the authoritarian pressures of evolutionary drift. Thus, the
value of undertaking the contemporary generalization and
respecification of constitutionalism is to ensure that these benefits are
61. See Csar A. Rodriguez-Garavito & Luis Carlos Arenas, Indigenous Rights,
Transnational Activism, and Legal Mobilization: The Struggle of the U'wa People in
Colombia, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN
LEGALITY, supra note 16, at 241, 241-44.
62. See MUNCK, supra note 13, at 75-93 (discussing case studies where social
movements have played a role in global governance).
63. This argument follows Santos's critique of systems theoretical theories of law in
general, that by basing their approach in "conception of the autonomy of law in the liberal
state," which is then extended to reflexive law of social sub-systems, they are "devolving to
modern state law what it never had." SANTOS, supra note 40, at 57-58.
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available in the global age. In other words, more constitutionalism is
regarded as part of the solution to problems of global governance.
For Teubner, societal constitutionalism is at its optimal when the
structural coupling between autonomous legal and social processes
restrains both the various constitutions generated by social institutions,
and the constitutions of institutionalized politics, in terms of their
"possibilities of influence."64 However, the problem of structural
corruption in the context of global governance-exemplified, for
example, by the financial crisis which began in 2008-means that where
the emphasis was previously on liberating social sectors from state
politics, now the central issue is how to place effective limits on
self-regulating nonstate constitutional forms. Teubner argues that
societal constitutionalism is well placed to respond to this "dynamic
disequilibrium," by "steer[ing] a difficult path between external
interventions and pressures towards self-limitation."65 This is to be
achieved through a form of "hybrid regulation" whereby an admixture of
"[plolitical-legal regulation and external social influence" applies
pressure to the subsystem in question: however, the precise prescription
for particular problems cannot be known in advance.66
However, adverting to the actual political contexts from which social
movements have emerged presents a quite different historical
perspective on constitutionalism. Highly relevant here is the setting of
post-colonial societies, where, from the viewpoint of the colonized,
constitutional strategies have more often sought to erode rather than
strengthen social differentiation.67 We can make two important points
in this connection. First, that it is impossible to fully understand the
nature of modern constitutionalism-state or societal-without taking
into account the imperial context.6 8 Accordingly, when societal
constitutionalism is generalizing from the Western state tradition, it
should also be seen as generalizing from that state tradition as informed
by the imperial encounter. Secondly, the effects of imperialism and
colonialism on constitutional discourse continue to reverberate today.
For example, the emphasis upon binary coding as foundational to
societal constitutionalism can be seen to take account of the ways in
which the power to name social phenomena as legal or illegal is removed
64. Teubner, supra note 33 at, 20.
65. Teubner, supra note 28, at 223, 225.
66. Id. at 225.
67. See generally JAMES TULLY, STRANGE MULTIPLICITY: CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AN
AGE OF DIVERSITY 58-98 (1995) (exploring the historical tendency to cultural uniformity in
modern constitutionalism).
68. See Scott Veitch, Authority, Exploitation and the Idea of Public Law, in PUBLIC
LAW AND POLITICS: THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 27, 31 (Emilios
Christodoulidis & Stephen Tierney eds., 2008).
893
INDIANA JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES 20:2
from certain groups. This is particularly acute in reference to social
movements, as their activities are often directed to what would be seen
as the nonlegal, or even alegal, in terms of the conventional
understandings of law.69
Reference to the colonial and postcolonial contexts amplifies a more
general concern that has been raised over societal constitutionalism's
relationship to questions of power. In that connection, Chris Thornhill
has elsewhere argued that at the level of "power theory," Teubner's
account of constitutionalism is grounded in "an original homology
between statehood and society's politicality."70 However, taking as the
antecedent the classical state theory which societal constitutionalism
more generally seeks to transcend leads, he contends, to a neglect of
"transformations that occur within political power as an autonomous
medium of social exchange."7 1 Bringing social movements into view
helps explain why it is important for societal constitutionalism to avoid
engaging with a broader conception of power constellations. Crucially,
the top-down institutionally focused model presumes a certain leveling
of power such that social actors can deliberate with each other on
relatively equal terms. However, globalization from below directs
discussion to the-as yet unrealized-preconditions, which would enable
this collaborative governance to occur, in particular the "redistribution
of resources to counter power asymmetries."72 Accordingly, in drawing
attention to this tendency "to bracket deep power asymmetries among
actors,"73 social movements direct the debate precisely to questions of
the relation between power and constitutionalism, which theories of
societal constitutionalism seek to avoid.
C. Interrogating the Western Origins of Constitutionalism
A social movement perspective also illuminates a third assumption
informing societal constitutionalism, namely that the theory and
practice of modern Western constitutionalism provide the default
setting for discussing constitutionalism in a global context. Such
assumptions are particularly prevalent in the public institutional
approaches to constitutionalism beyond the state, where lists of innate
characteristics of constitutionalism tend to include structural features of
69. See SANTOS, supra note 40, at 61-66.
70. Chris Thornhill, Constitutional Law from the Perspective of Power: A Response to
Gunther Teubner, in Debate and Dialogue: Constitutionalizing Polycontexturality, supra
note 28, at 244, 246.
71. Id. at 245.
72. Santos & Rodriguez-Garavito, supra note 49, at 8.
73. Id.
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Western constitutions, including judicial review, separation of powers,
and means for resolving hierarchical claims between official norms. 74
Within such accounts, the relative position of (some more, some less)
constitutionalized supranational entities leads to constitutionalism
being posited as a continuum, in contrast to measuring its presence in
all-or-nothing terms. However, what is sometimes overlooked in this
formulation is that it is constitutionalism as developed within the
Western nation-state, which is presumptively at the widest end of that
continuum. This formula embodies all the requisite constitutional
qualities which, in suitably adapted form, are now to be located in
nonstate fora. Theories of societal constitutionalism, though, appear to
offer a different mode of analysis in which constitutionalism does not
develop chronologically from the state to the nonstate environment.
Moreover, its insistence that constitutionalism subsists as a set of
"procedural-normative restraints on arbitrary exercises of collective
power"75 moves it away from attempts to catalogue whether a sufficient
mass of constitutional mechanisms can be found in any putative
constitutional site. However, notwithstanding these ostensible
divergences, it is argued that societal constitutionalism's approach to
the relation between globalization and constitutionalism can be
regarded as an extension of existing debates within Western
constitutional thought.
In one of his last published essays, David Sciulli set out a clear and
spirited defense of societal constitutionalism's distinctiveness. Sciulli
argued that once properly understood, this distinctiveness counters any
charges of particularism which may be leveled against it. In contrast
with Anglo-North American approaches, which locate the constraining
power of constitutionalism in the 'constituent force' in civil society,"
and the continental European tradition, where "the aura and majesty of
the state" performs this function, he argues that it is only societal
constituents that can fully account for the bright line restraints of
limited government.76 These constituents, found in both civil society and
the agencies of state, are "the participants in any structured situation
who, in simply advancing their own immediate positional and corporate
interests, simultaneously establish and then maintain the integrity of a
74. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 26, at 35, 56.
75. David Sciulli, Societal Constitutionalism: Procedural Legality and Legitimation in
Global and Civil Society, in LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY: NORMATIVE AND SOCIOLOGICAL
APPROACHES 103, 104 (Chris Thornhill & Samantha Ashenden eds., 2010) (emphasis
removed).
76. Id. at 103-04.
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collegial (or deliberative) form of organization and of the threshold
standard of procedural integrity."77
In emphasizing this procedural threshold standard for guarding
against caprice, two important points follow for Sciulli. First, that there
cannot be "any set of ultimate substantive-normative restraints on
arbitrariness" 78 that can generate sufficient consensus to operate across
cultures (a fortiori in the transnational context.)7 9 Second, by occupying
these positions, societal constituents enable every other actor "to
identify bright line thresholds of 'progress' or 'regress' when it comes to
evaluating specific policy proposals.80
Sciulli finds this analysis especially pertinent with regard to those
who see social movements as a vehicle of social emancipation, arguing
that any attempt to construct a constitutional order that seeks to
benefit the poor and the weak necessarily does so at the expense of
procedural integrity.8 1 For Sciulli, the danger is that without the
structural underpinnings of procedural restraint provided by societal
constituents, the substantive rationality embodied by social movements
can (and on his reading of the historical record, does) easily lapse into
autocracy. 82 One can acknowledge that Sciulli raises important
questions about the potential hegemonic nature of substantive
rationality-and note in passing that such questions are by no means
absent from the social movement literature8 3-while querying the
implication that they uniquely arise for theorists of social movements.
Sciulli's analysis appears to confirm societal constitutionalism's
close affinity with globalization from above. Professional groups,
expressly including corporations-and which in many renderings are
seen as integral in constructing globalization from above 84 -are
valorized as their disinterested deliberations pursue responsible and
impersonal interests consistent with lawfulness (as opposed to the
"commitment to correctness or right" of social movements).8 5 There is a
crucial contrast here with analyses of globalization from below which
emphasizes that social movements embody a different type of
77. Id. at 119.
78. Id. at 104.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 119.
81. Id. at 118.
82. Id. at 119.
83. See, e.g., MUNCK, supra note 13, at 110-26.
84. See, e.g., YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT G. GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE: INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER
(1996).
85. Sciulli, supra note 75, at 120.
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lawfulness, on Santos's terms, a "subaltern cosmopolitan legality."8 6
Each represents not just a different paradigm of globalization, but of
law. Sciulli's version of societal constitutionalism cannot, on
procedural-normative grounds alone, tell us which amounts to
lawfulness, and which does not. Given the cross-cultural differences,
which underpin the opposing paradigms, on Sciulli's own terms we
cannot expect to generate a consensus on this issue-particularly once
we locate them in global context. This places societal constitutionalism
in a bind: on the one hand, globalization from below is said to represent
the type of substantive-rationality which. is impermissible under the
procedural model, but on the other, to exclude it requires societal
constitutionalism to flout its own injunction against privileging one
substantive-rationality over another.8 7
As such, Sciulli's arguments become open to the critique advanced
vis-a-vis the global spread of liberal rights beyond North America and
Western Europe. Namely, that the emphasis on the procedural
guarantees masks a substantive project, and moreover one whose effect,
if not motive, is to entrench the present-from the perspective of
globalization from below, inequitable-global distribution of resources.8 8
If globalization from below highlights the paradigmatic nature of
current debates, societal constitutionalism seeks to foreclose that debate
by denying paradigmatic status to the former. But to do so requires
societal constitutionalism to reveal its own paradigmatic colors. In
seeing globalization from above exclusively as a site of legal and
constitutional production, societal constitutionalism draws on
institutional understandings of legality as developed within Western
modernity. Presenting this as the only option available denies the
politics of definition which are always in play when assigning the label
law to some social phenomena and not others.89
This connects to the more general point that the overall effect of the
three assumptions discussed above is a depoliticization of constitutional
discourse. Adapting David Harvey, they reinforce the preferred model of
neoliberal rule through technocratic governance by elites, with the
86. SANTOS, supra note 40, at 465.
87. Moreover, such substantive-normative rationality would appear required to
elaborate what in practice constitutes the "responsible" and "impersonal" behavior of
professional actors, and similarly how social movements should confine themselves, as
Sciulli appears to suggest, to "obviously just goals." Sciulli, supra note 75, at 120
(emphasis removed).
88. See David Schneiderman, Comparative Constitutional Law in an Age of Economic
Globalization, in DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 237, 238
(Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 2002).
89. See GAVIN W. ANDERSON, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AFTER GLOBALIZATION 107-15
(2005).
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corollary that questions of resource allocation are best left to experts in
the field.90 Indeed, for Sciulli, the fear that everything might become
politicized underpins the procedural turn of societal constitutionalism.9 1
However, in challenging these assumptions, and in particular by
locating this challenge in the paradigmatic debate between
globalizations from above and below, social movements suggest that
processes of politicization cannot be avoided. Thus, any account of the
relation between globalization and constitutionalism that seeks to
obscure these movements, is itself necessarily partial. Accordingly, a
social movement perspective suggests that if our objective is to map the
relation between globalization and constitutionalism, it requires a fuller
approach that moves beyond the assumptions informing theories of
societal constitutionalism.
II. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY
The arguments outlined in the previous section support the claim
that social movements' habitual exclusion from constitutional discourse
is not an oversight, or simply coincidental, but can be attributed to the
critical spotlight they shed upon assumptions about constitutionalism's
necessary institutional, benevolent, and Western-originated character,
which constitutional theory would generally prefer to leave undisturbed.
In the remainder of this paper, we turn from explaining the absence of
social movements to theorizing the implications of their presence. The
argument advanced here is that undertaking such an exercise is not to
be feared, and moreover is essential both in terms of the sociological
ambition of societal constitutionalism of enhancing our understanding
of constitutionalism itself, but also with regard to its normative aim of
ensuring that power is held to account. In other words,
constitutionalism not only can, but indeed must, transcend the
limitations of the assumptions delineated above.
Before proceeding, it is important to address a potential definitional
objection to the inclusion of social movements within constitutional
theory. This would argue that it is one thing to say that focusing upon
social movements causes us to reevaluate the extent to which
constitutionalism embodies certain qualities, but quite another to
regard the former as constitutional sites in their own right. Put
differently, it is a considerable leap from critical perspective to
constitutional subject. However, following societal constitutionalism's
sociological method to its logical conclusion shows that social
90. See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM 65-66 (2005).
91. Sciulli, supra note 75, at 121.
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movements are always already a component part of constitutional
discourse. This claim builds on the key insight of societal
constitutionalism that the normative enterprise of mediating between
diverse and often antagonistic interests provides a crucial framing
mechanism for the exercise of power that can be broadly located within
human society. But if abi societas, ibi costituo, we should also take
seriously the criticism that societal constitutionalism is insufficiently
sociological when it tethers itself too rigidly to the particular form of
society that developed within the contours of Western liberalism. 92 In
doing so, societal constitutionalism places ways of framing the exercise
of power which draw on alternative imaginings of society beyond the
constitutional pale. And if, as argued above, theories of
constitutionalism are, in Sciulli's terms, necessarily substantive
normative rationalities, when the range of such possible rationalities is
reduced to one, what is excluded remains no less constitutional. Thus,
considering the constitutional relevance of social movements serves to
remind that any putative positing of constitutionalism is always open to
the question of what is excluded. The argument advanced below is that
social movements, as key protagonists within globalization from below,
provide such an alternative account of constitutionalism.
A. From Globalization from Below to Constitutionalism from Below
In setting out the argument that an-until now-obscured
constitutionalism from below has always been present alongside the
more visible constitutionalism from above, there are some helpful
analogies to be drawn with the emergence of globalization from below as
a distinctive paradigm. As discussed above, during the height of the
"Washington consensus," globalization tended to be depicted in singular
terms, and largely equated with the hegemonic sway of neoliberalism.
However, over the past decade, and coinciding with the greater
prominence of social movement activism, it has been argued that there
are now two rival paradigms of globalization. 93 Variously described as
counter-hegemonic globalization, or, more commonly, globalization from
below, the second paradigm challenges the idea that neoliberal
"horizon[s] of feasibility"94 provide the only, or indeed inevitable, path of
92. See Thornhill, supra note 70, at 245. Thornhill argues that in tying itself too rigidly
to an "over-literal" view of statehood, societal constitutionalism thereby discounts "the
wider history of the formation of political power in modern societies." Id.
93. Santos, supra note 29, at 29.
94. Richard Falk, Global Climate Change, Human Security and the Future of
Democracy, in GLOBAL CRISES AND THE CRISIS OF GLOBAL LEADERSHIP 89, 105 (Stephen
Gill ed., 2012).
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global development. In its place, it offers a noncapitalist, nonviolent
vision of global transformation, which moves "beyond liberalism and
real socialism."9 5
The terms of engagement between these two paradigms are
extensively discussed elsewhere, but for present purposes, there are two
points to highlight from this debate. First, theorists of globalization
from below are engaged in the task of recovery not discovery, and are
drawing attention to the opposition to neoliberalism, which was always
there alongside it, but often lost in late twentieth century narratives
about the end of history. In other words, the seeds of globalization from
below were planted long before protests in Seattle and Genoa caught the
world's attention. Following from this, one of the consequences of
politics and law being increasingly conceived of in global terms is that
"below" is shedding the obscurity that prevailed within state-focused
approaches. In part, this can be attributed to changes in the media. For
example, worldwide access to YouTube, leading to greater visibility of
protest and unrest,9 6 is an indication that neoliberalism has been
signally unable to contain its own contradictions.97 Bringing these
points together, it has been suggested, updating Polanyian terminology,
that globalization from below is part of a contemporary double
movement, representing society's latent capacity for self-protection
against the resurgent project of embedding society in the economy.98
We argue here that these antagonisms between globalizations from
above and below are replicated in the constitutional context,
highlighting important ways that current theories of societal
constitutionalism can be developed. It is now commonplace that
globalization from above has given rise to new constitutional relations,
of both a formal and informal nature. Critics of this
constitutionalization of economic globalization argue that it represents a
framework for the exercise of power, which places the pursuit of policy
options antithetical to neoliberalism beyond the reach of democratic
majorities.9 9 There is possibly more critical purchase in interrogating
the reduction of debates about the relation between globalization and
constitutionalism to the latter's nexus with globalization from above.
While presumably not their intention, one effect of this exclusivity is to
remove from these debates the vision offered by a globalization from
below as a potential alternative way of framing global power
95. ENRIQUE DUSSEL, TWENTY THESES ON POLITICS at xvi (2008) (emphasis removed).
96. See MASON, supra note 1, at 33-37.
97. See SANTOS, supra note 40, at 10.
98. See MUNCK, supra note 13, at 34-39.
99. See DAVID SCHNEIDERMAN, CONSTITUTIONALIZING ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION:
INVESTMENT RULES AND DEMOCRACY'S PROMISE 9-10 (2008).
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relationships. This is particularly pertinent with regard to societal
constitutionalism, as its methodological aversion to accommodating
globalization from below can be seen as an attempt to exclude the
antagonisms, which the latter brings to light from constitutional
discourse. But as, when called upon to justify this approach, societal
constitutionalism is ultimately required to state its substantive
preference for globalization from above as the framework for resolving
questions of global governance, in practice it cannot eliminate these
antagonisms. In other words, societal constitutionalism does not
overcome the "irreducibly antinomic"100 nature of constitutional
discourse, but rather displaces it to the transnational sphere where the
tensions between opposing paradigms of globalization make it more
difficult to avoid than in national settings.
Acknowledging this irreducible antinomy, it is suggested, is the
necessary starting point for theorizing the connections between
globalization and constitutionalism. This does not mean that we should
not, or cannot, address the question of how to take seriously the
empirical fact of social and cultural pluralism, but that doing so cannot
be achieved by the suppression of genuine and reasonable differences
entailed by the reduction of constitutionalism to constitutionalism from
above. In that connection, we can highlight a growing literature which,
though not always couched in self-consciously constitutional terms, can
be seen to represent a nascent school of constitutionalism from below.
The starting point here is to reconnect constitutional discourse with
popular forms of politics which are of most relevance to the bulk of the
planet. 101 For Enrique Dussel, connecting to these developments, as
embodied through various "political springs," requires a new theoretical
approach based in a "coherent interpretation of the profound
transformation that . . . people are experiencing."10 2 It is argued that
doing so recasts received histories, for example, to highlight the
inherently bottom-up and social dimension to struggles about rights in
contrast with their more top-down and individualistic conception in the
Western canon. 103
In constitutional theory, recent scholarship has sought to recover an
alternative history-and future-of constitutionalism beyond the
institutional realm. On this account, constitutionalism has always
100. Emilios Christodoulidis, Against Substitution: The Constitutional Thinking of
Dissensus, in THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND
CONSTITUTIONAL FORM 189, 191 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker eds., 2007).
101. PARTHA CHATTERJEE, THE POLITICS OF THE GOVERNED: REFLECTIONS ON POPULAR
POLITICS IN MOST OF THE WORLD 3 (2004).
102. DUSSEL, supra note 95, at xv.
103. See STAMMERS, supra note 11, at 40-69.
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consisted of the relation between the formal (institutional) and the
informal (noninstitutional). Returning to the colonial context underlines
this point: for Tully, notwithstanding the imperial preference for
institutional uniformity, the hidden constitutions of indigenous societies
were never fully extinguished, and indeed continued to inform
indigenous settler relations. 104 The resurgence of indigenous
constitutional ideas as part of globalization from below confirms that
they should not be seen as "simply minor disturbances on the frontier of
modern constitutionalism," 0 5 but as equally important constitutional
products of the imperial relationship as the more visible forms of
constitutionalism from above. Tully characterizes the present
geopolitical conjuncture in terms of an informal imperialism: by
comparison with the gunboat, the objective here is to normalize the
prerogative of the West to trade on its own terms with non-Western
societies, and, if necessary, to supplant local constitutional forms which
provide obstacles to its realization.106 However, his analysis here is that
again this supplanting has not been wholly successful, as evidenced by
the myriad forms of extra-institutional resistance to neoliberalism.10 7 In
this regard, he argues that we should conceive of globalization in terms
of the relation between state and supranational constitutional forms on
the one hand, and on the other, those constituent powers found both
within and outside the structures of representative democracy. The
latter is comprised of decolonization and internationalist movements, as
well as alternative NGOs and bodies which escape traditional
categorization, such as the World Social Forum.108
B. Constitutionalism from Below and Social Transformation
Constitutionalism from below not only stands for a different
approach to framing the exercise of political power, but also rests on a
different understanding of the nature of that power. Within traditional
constitutional theory, radical change takes place through the exercise of
constituent power, which, once galvanized, reforms the institutions of
104. See TULLY, supra note 67, at 99-101.
105. Id. at 99.
106. James Tully, On Law, Democracy and Imperialism, in PUBLIC LAW AND POLITICS:
THE SCOPE AND LIMITS OF CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 68, at 69, 97.
107. James Tully, The Imperialism of Modern Constitutional Democracy, in THE
PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM: CONSTITUENT POWER AND CONSTITUTIONAL FORM,
supra note 100, at 315, 337.
108. Id. at 321. See also Ruth Buchanan, Legitimating Global Trade Governance:
Constitutional and Legal Pluralist Approaches, 57 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 1, 9 (2006).
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state and the baselines for permissible constitutional conduct.10 9 Within
theories of societal constitutionalism, constituent power is necessarily
more diffuse and not confined to formal politics; however, each social
subsystem is open to its own constitutional moment where a decision
has to be made "between the total destruction of [its growth-energies]
and its self-limitation."1 0 In each case, the ultimate question for
constitutional theory is when the prevailing institutional order should
be dismantled, and how it can be remade. The imperative of
reconfiguring constituent power so that prevailing institutional
arrangements can be transformed also informs critical constitutional
theory."1 However, it has been argued that this succumbs to the "the
hegemony of hegemony,"112 that is, seeing institutions as something to
be captured and exercised differently risks replacing one particularistic
articulation of power interests with another.
The modus operandi of social movements, however, is not geared
towards reordering the established institutional framework of power.
Rather, their extra-institutional forms of direct action are better
captured under the heading of the nonhegemonic, denoting how they
seek to "refuse, rather than rearticulate"1' 3 the forces of neoliberalism:
accordingly, they seek to transcend, not capture, the container of
institutional power, whether that of state or societal constituents. As
such, globalization from below is said to move beyond the reform or
revolution cleavage which has informed modern political struggle. The
objective of entities such as the World Social Forum is not to seize
power, "but rather to change the power relations in oppression's many
faces," 114 and which accordingly prioritizes pragmatic, often
incremental, strategies of change.
In this connection, Santos highlights a number of important ways in
which social movement activism expands the politics of legality. First,
this sees legal mobilization always within broader processes of political
mobilization; thus, the subaltern cosmopolitan legality, which is thereby
propagated is a political strategy comprising legal elements. Secondly,
(and addressing concerns regarding the potentially totalizing nature of
such legality), the focus of these struggles is not, as was historically the
109. See, e.g., 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1993) (discussing
the U.S. Constitution).
110. Gunther Teubner, A Constitutional Moment? The Logics of "Hitting the Bottom", in
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS IN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE: THE DARK SIDE OF FUNCTIONAL
DIFFERENTIATION 3, 12 (Poul F. Kjaer et al. eds., 2011).
111. See MICHAEL HARDT & ANTONIO NEGRI, EMPIRE 356-59 (2000).
112. Richard J.F. Day, From Hegemony to Affinity: The Political Logic of the Newest
Social Movements, 18 CULTURAL STUD. 716, 725 (2004).
113. Id. at 730.
114. Santos, supra note 29, at 51.
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case for emancipatory politics, solely directed towards social
redistribution, but instead rests "on a complex and dynamic balance
between the principle of equality and the principle of recognition of
difference."'"1 Thirdly, where law is employed, it is as likely to be "local
unofficial law" as state or transnational law, thus underscoring the
"transcalar nature of legal mobilization." 16 Finally, and following the
legal struggles entered into by social movements, it draws on a diverse
range of legal knowledge, going beyond its (state or societal)
professional strain to include that produced, inter alia, by indigenous
peoples, landless peasants, migrants, peace activists, and those working
in the informal economy. 117
From the perspective of systemic understandings of law, social
movements thus present a "rather messy and potentially
uncategorizable" picture.118 However, to the extent that this is seen to
be a fuller and more representative account of contemporary legal and
political struggle, it also propels us to think beyond the ordered surfaces
and planes generally associated with constitutionalism. One promising
alternative is provided by theories of nodal governance, which begin
from the premise that a proper understanding of how power is exercised
and dispersed is a necessary precursor to procuring just and competent
forms of governance.119 To that end, society is conceived in terms of the
interaction between various collectivities, which leads to (not always
intentional) outcomes that include social goods, such as economic
growth or general well-being, and social problems, such as poverty or
illness. Nodes are connected to each other through networks: a node can
be one point within a single network; it can be connected with other
nodes in a plurality of networks; or it can be a "superstructural node," in
which various collectivities put together their resources in pursuit of a
shared objective. 120
The framework of nodal analysis thus provides a means of
accommodating the horizontal legal and political relations described in
the social movement literature. Under this approach, distinctions, such
115. Id. at 61. Santos elsewhere elaborates on the nature of that relationship: "people
have the right to be equal whenever difference makes them inferior, but they also have
the right to be different whenever equality jeopardizes their identity." Boaventura de
Sousa Santos, Human Rights as an Emancipatory Script? Cultural and Political
Conditions, in ANOTHER KNOWLEDGE IS POSSIBLE: BEYOND NORTHERN EPISTEMOLOGIES 2,
28 (Boaventura de Sousa Santos ed., 2008).
116. Santos, supra note 29, at 61.
117. Id.
118. Ruth Buchanan, The Constitutive Paradox of Modern Law: A Comment on Tully, 46
OSGOODE HALL L.J. 495, 497 (2008).
119. Scott Burris et al., Nodal Governance, 30 AuSTL. J. LEGAL PHIL. 30, 31 (2005).
120. Id. at 38.
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as those between official and nonofficial, are unimportant, and
moreover, obfuscatory. While state and societal institutions are
important nodal points, they have no privileged analytical position. 121
To take the example of recent transnational struggles over the
protection of intellectual property rights, a nodal analysis accords
appropriate weight to the actions of societal constituents, in particular
the U.S. pharmaceutical corporations. Burris and his collaborators
argue that through activating a superstructural node, these companies
secured the passage of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), even though for many countries
other than the United States, this imposed high costs with regard to
producing generic, as opposed to patented, medicines. However, by
analytically assuming a horizontal plane, nodal theory helps avoid the
depoliticizing conclusion to which this one-sided account might lead.
Instead, it enables us to see that social movements can also form
superstructural nodes. Thus, in the context of the campaign for
affordable anti-retroviral drugs in South Africa, local activists formed
such a node with various transnational development and health NGOs
to mobilize a counter-TRIPs network to challenge the protected position
of pharmaceutical companies against the manufacture of generic
medicines. This example also shows that the most effective nodal
resources come in the messy noninstitutional form of globalization from
below as the coalition's efforts led to a significant reduction in the cost of
HIV/AIDS treatment.122
This leads to a final, but vital, implication of constitutionalism from
below, namely that we can, at the same time, acknowledge the
complexity of governance in the context of globalization and theorize the
latter's transformation. As such, social movements direct our attention
to the more general blind spot within systems' theoretical approaches to
law with regard to the relation between structure and agency, and how
this produces social change.123 Here, Stammers suggests that adverting
to social movements challenges the prevalent view that agency and
structure necessarily stand in opposition to each other.124 Drawing on
the work of Piotr Sztompka, he posits a more nuanced alternative,
which sees agency as produced by both structures and (individual and
collective) actors, and with this, "the capacity to influence actions and
121. See Clifford Shearing & Jennifer Wood, Nodal Governance, Democracy and the New
'Denizens', 30 J.L. & SOc'Y 400, 404 (2003).
122. See Heinz Klug, Campaigning for Life: Building a New Transnational Solidarity in
the Face of HIV/AIDS and TRIPS, in LAW AND GLOBALIZATION FROM BELOW: TOWARDS A
COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY, supra note 16, at 118-19.
123. See SANTOS, supra note 40, at 58-59.
124. See STAMMERS, supra note 11, at 25-27.
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outcomes."125 Stammers suggests that this fits better with the more
fluid "creative praxis" of social movements: not only are the latter often
catalysts for social transformation against apparently over determining
structures, but to the extent their endeavors are directed to changing
these structures, they can be seen to generate more than simply discrete
acts of resistance. On this understanding of social change, social
movements are ideally placed "to straddle the porous boundaries
between institutional and everyday worlds."126 Furthermore, this would
seem to counter the argument that social movements can never do more
than reproduce the power relations of the institutional arrangements
they seek to challenge, leading us to conceive of social struggle from
below as a means of effecting "contingent progress through social
transformation."127 In these ways, constitutionalism from below seeks to
transcend the limitations of institutional analysis.
CONCLUSION
Most theorists of constitutionalism beyond the state would likely
agree with Neil Walker's reflection that by engaging with globalization,
constitutional discourse opens itself to a meta level of analysis.128 In this
regard, the meta prefix is generally understood to denote the relational
character of constitutionalism, brought about by the proliferation of
constitutional sites. Thus, much of the initial literature focused upon
the interaction between state and emerging supranational
constitutional sites; societal constitutionalism has added to, and
enormously enriched, this body of work by extending the scope of
analysis to include the constitutional relations generated in the
transnational private sphere. However, such discussions always take
place within the shadow of a further meta dimension, namely, because
our current conception of constitutionalism is only meaningful in light of
various antecedent separations. Much of the critical response to
globalization from above thus far tracks a separation well documented
in the national context between economics and politics. Here, we have
sought to draw attention to a different separation, namely that between
the institutional and the noninstitutional dimensions of
constitutionalism. In the global age, this separation can no longer be
obscured: accordingly, addressing the implication of constitutionalism
from below becomes one of the central issues for the ensuing debates on
the relation between globalization and constitutionalism.
125. Id. at 25.
126. Id. at 36.
127. Id. at 30.
128. Walker, supra note 26, at 36.
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